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Abstract
The relationship between national saving and investment over the long term is exam-
ined for six Gulf Arab oil-exporting developing countries – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. We show that, provided some large outliers are
properly accounted for, long-run equilibrium relationships between saving and investment
(both total and fixed) exist in these countries. Since these countries have typically large
current account surpluses such relationships cannot be explained by standard arguments.
Our hypothesis is that the response of investment to saving largely depends on domestic
absorptive capacity.
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1 Introduction
Ever since the publication of Feldstein and Horioka (1980), the correlation between saving (S )
and investment (I ) as ratios of GDP (Y ) has been extensively tested in the literature. Ac-
cording to the Intertemporal Theory of the Current Account, under perfect capital mobility
the correlation between saving and investment should be zero.1 However, examining average
investment-to-GDP and saving-to-GDP ratios in 16 OECD countries over the 1960-1974 pe-
riod, Feldstein and Horioka (1980), henceforth FH, documented regression coefficients within
the interval 0.85-0.95, indicating that there is almost a one-to-one positive association between
saving and investment rates. FH interpreted their finding as evidence of low capital mobility:
investment depends on domestic savings because capitals do not move across economies. This
evidence, christened “Feldstein-Horioka puzzle” (in fact, “the mother of all puzzles”, according
to Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000) for its stark contrast with the prediction that capital is highly
mobile across countries, has stirred an enormous literature. Surveying nearly 200 papers, Aper-
gis and Tsoumas (2009) conclude that the overall evidence of a saving-investment relationship
is weaker for developing countries than for richer ones,2 which is in fact not too surprising in
view of the typical importance for the former of foreign aid and foreign direct investments.
Our objective in this paper is to empirically analyze the FH puzzle in a special group of oil-
exporting developing economies, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which includes
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), over the
period 1970-2008 (hence including all oil shocks and dramatic events such as the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait). The case of oil-exporting developing economies, and especially of the GCC countries,
is interesting for two main reasons.
First, unlike in other oil-producing countries, hydrocarbon3 resources (oil and gas) play a
dominant role. For instance, in 2007, the hydrocarbon revenues contributed to 78%, 76% and
40%, respectively, to GCC’s government revenues, exports and gross domestic product.4 It is
1This is the case because given the exogenous world interest rate, under perfect capital mobility, the saving
and investment schedules are affected by independent factors.
2Note however that Di Iorio and Fachin (2010a,b) using robust and powerful bootstrap panel cointegration
tests can find evidence of a long-run saving-investment relationship only in some of the largest OECD economies.
3Throughout this paper, the words “hydrocarbon” and “oil” are used interchangeably.
4As it is well-known, petroleum is heavily concentrated in a relatively small geographic area in the Middle
East: the GCC countries hold about 40% of global oil reserve, while the region’s population represents less than
1 percent of the global total (Abi-Aad, 2009). See Table A.1 in the Appendix for further details.
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thus not surprising to discover that to a large extent, in these countries national saving appears
to be strongly linked to the foreign demand for oil. This relationship stands out clearly from the
plots reported in Fig. 1: with the only exceptions of Bahrain and Qatar after 2000, savings and
oil revenues follow paths so closely related to be difficult to distinguish. The heavy dependence
on a single commodity export, oil, which serves as the principal source of government revenues,
has a significant bearing on saving and investment choices – particularly during times of lower
oil price which leads to painful budget cuts in many oil-exporting countries. Depending on
single commodity export is not uncommon for developing countries. However, differently from
agricultural cash crops, oil is depletable. Although GCC oil reserves are quite large (the average
reserves-to-production ratio for GCC oil was estimated in the year 2008 at 73 years: Abi-Aad,
2009), they will not last forever. Therefore, as already pointed out by Amuzegar (1983), any
permanent loss in the nation’s stock of capital through the sale of a barrel of oil has important
consequence on the nation’s development strategy, hence investments.
Second, differently from most other economies, the external balances of the countries we
examine are almost always positive, in fact strongly so. The annual average current account
balance (as a percent of GDP) over the 1980-2008 period was 10.60% for the GCC region,
compared to -0.72% for G7 countries. The comparable figures for individual GCC countries
ranged from a low of 2.0% for Saudi Arabia, to a high of 25.0% for Qatar.5 Large accumulation
of current account surplus during the recent episode of rising oil prices has helped the GCC
region to emerge as a major net supplier of capital on a global scale, second only to East Asian
countries (Sturm et al. 2008). As a consequence, capital movements are bound to be extremely
free; this expectation is confirmed by the Chinn and Ito (2008) capital openness index. 6 The
presence of typically large and positive current account balances and free capital movements
leads to expect domestic capital formation to be independent from savings: the latter depends
on foreign demand for oil, the former should be limited only by the presence of profitable
investment opportunities in the domestic economy. As we will see, our results will suggest this
not be true: in GCC countries investments do depend on savings, though with elasticities highly
5Source: authors’ calculations based on IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2010.
6It is worth mentioning that as GCC economies lack independent monetary policies as a result of the pegged
exchange rates (barring Kuwaiti dinar) with the U.S. dollar, free capital movement between GCC and the rest
of world, therefore, is a natural consequence of the Impossible Trinity demonstrated by Mundell (1963). This
unique institutional feature of free capital movement make GCC countries a natural test-bed for the FH puzzle.
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variable across countries. We shall argue that these difference are likely to reflect the variations
in resource endowment and absorptive capacity across the GCC economies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we briefly discuss some non-
standard features of savings and investment in oil-exporting developing economies; in Section
3, we present the empirical results; finally, in Section 4 we draw some conclusions.
2 Income, consumption and savings in oil-exporting developing
countries: A non-standard set up7
Several complications arise while deciding on the magnitude of oil income to be exchanged for
current national consumption and savings, and the allocation of savings for investment. Part
of the difficulty stems from the fact that as the State exclusively holds the ownership and
extraction rights to hydrocarbon resources, oil export revenues, therefore, accrue directly to
the national treasuries. Hence, State’s discretion and decision for the saving-investment mix
can sharply differ from that of private sector’s preferences – leading to “changes in both the
character and the composition of GDP, as well as the tempo and direction of the economy’s
development” (Amuzegar 1983, p. 11). The exhaustibility of oil reserves also poses a long-term
challenge concerning the issue of fiscal sustainability and intergenerational resource allocation.
As such, oil left underground is a form of autoinvestment for future exploitation and use,
whose real yield will be determined by changes in the future real net price of oil. But this is
no occasion for discussing the operational aspects of fiscal policy in oil-exporting developing
countries, interested readers are referred to Barnett and Ossowski (2002) and the references
therein.
As the current levels of consumption per capita in most oil-exporting developing countries
are low by international standards,8 (political) pressures for immediate distribution of the oil
proceeds escalate during the oil revenue boom. According to the classical intertemporal model
of consumption, higher saving comes at the expense of current consumption. However, when
7Some of this discussion draws heavily on Amuzegar (1983), which, although a bit dated, remains a classic
introduction to this subject.
8For instance, over the 1970-2008 period real household consumption per capita in the G7 countries was 2.36
times higher than it was in the GCC countries. The difference rose to 2.64 during the recent oil price boom (2002
to mid-2008), mostly due to rising inflationary pressures from higher consumption spending in GCC economies.
Source: authors’ calculations based on the National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, United Nations.
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the magnitude of oil revenue accumulation is high enough, both consumption and saving can
increase simultaneously, thereby obscuring the classical notion that saving and investment come
at the expense of current consumption (Amuzegar, 1983).9 Thus, here a domestic resource
(hydrocarbon) plays the role normally played by external lending or foreign direct investment
(FDI). Furthermore, the level of potential national saving in oil-exporting developing economies
is also determined by the degree of their domestic absorptive capacity – due to differences in
population, complementary resources, supply of skilled labor and domestic market size. Too
high a level of domestic investment, relative to available capacity to produce, often result in
an increase in prices of non-tradable goods. In such a case, a general policy prescription is to
partially restrict public investment until the capacity of the economy to respond has improved
(World Bank, 2006).10 Thus, at times when the overall savings from oil revenues are atypically
high, in general, a greater fraction of these savings is temporarily saved abroad until the domestic
production base has been reasonably expanded. It is therefore not surprising to discover that
savings rates in many oil-exporting developing countries are typically higher than those of other
groups of nations.11 Further evidence is provided in the next section.
Once the essential decision is made regarding the level of consumption and therefore savings,
the subsequent options involve various investment alternatives available to the State.12 Two
obvious alternatives are investment in domestic real assets and investment in foreign assets
(real and/or financial). Domestic capital formation can occur in both oil and non-oil sector.
9For example, during the oil boom of 1974-77, nominal investment expenditure of the 11 OPEC countries
grew at an annual average rate of 48.5%, while private and public consumption increased at average rates of 30%
and 38%, respectively. Similar trends were also observed during the most recent episode (2004-2008) of higher
oil price, when investment, private and public consumption grew by 22%, 19% and 18%, respectively. Source:
authors’ calculations based on the National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, United Nations. The 11 OPEC
member countries are: Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates and Venezuela.
10For instance, Collier and Gunning (2007) bring the example of Botswana. In this country whenever there
were signs of congestion in the construction sector, public investment project were deferred until the emerging
bottlenecks in the construction sector such as skill shortages were properly tackled. This kind of a plan-within-a-
plan help ensuring that demand and supply were broadly matched. Analyzing the management of mineral rents
between Botswana and Saudi Arabia, Auty (2001) blames the over-rapid domestic absorption of rents, among
other factors, as a factor behind Saudi Arabia’s long-term growth collapse compared to Botswana. For instance,
over the 1980-2008 period, the per-capita real GDP growth rate in Botswana was 4.77%, while it was -1.64% in
Saudi Arabia (the lowest in the GCC). Authors’ calculations based on World Economic Outlook Database, IMF,
October 2010.
11To some extent this phenomenon overlaps with capital flight from the oil-exporting countries. An excellent
analysis of capital flight from the Middle Eastern economies can be found in ESCWA (2008).
12Historically, for most oil-exporting developing countries—especially the low-absorbing GCC countries—the
mobilization of domestic savings was seldom a major economic issue. “The critical problem was how best to
use available resources, without inflationary consequences, to expand and diversify the economy and to correct
existing distortions through subsidies, transfers and rate setting in public agencies” (Amuzegar 1983, p. 44).
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Investment outside the oil sector has the advantage of promoting economic diversification by
diversifying domestic export and production and thereby reducing the dependence on the oil
sector. Now, a notable feature in the Persian Gulf countries examined here, private domestic
investment is low relative to public investment. For example, in the GCC countries the pri-
vate/public investment ratio was less than 2:1 in the 1990s; whereas, for OECD countries it
was over 6:1 (Sala-i-Martin and Artadi, 2002). One of the reasons for the low level of private
investment in the GCC countries is the exactly lower decoupling of the non-oil sector from the
oil sector – resulting in an apparent dearth of investment opportunities.
At a micro level, lack of trustworthiness among people is another likely reason behind the
low level of private investment in the oil-exporting Gulf countries. In an experimental study,
Bohnet et al. (2010) find that Emiratis, Kuwaitis and Omanis require a substantially higher
minimum trustworthiness threshold before trusting than did the Americans and Swiss. As
investment requires placing one’s funds in the hands of another person, investment rates are
closely associated with people’s willingness to trust others (see Bohnet et al. 2010, for further
discussion). The dominance of public ownership in many large companies has also been blamed
for low levels of financial development in the Arab world (Sala-i-Martin and Artadi, 2002).
Underdeveloped financial markets force potential real investors into the hands of the banking
system, which has become an economically and politically powerful institution in many oil-
exporting developing countries. For example, the share of debt securities in the Middle Eastern
capital markets is only 5.6%, while bank assets and equities account for 94.4% of finance (IMF,
2009). As bank lending in the Arab world remains predominantly short-term and trade-related
(Sala-i-Martin and Artadi, 2002), domestic savings often are not properly channeled by the
financial sector to long-term productive projects. The situation is further exacerbated by public
sector’s heavy borrowing from the banking system during economic downturns (caused by low
oil prices), resulting in a crowding-out of private investment. Supporting evidence is provided
by Looney (1992) and Albatel (2005), who show that public expenditure actually has a negative
effect on private sector investment in Saudi Arabia; Sturm et al. (2009) are unable to find a
strong positive effect of a shock to public investment on private investment and non-oil GDP
growth in four oil-exporting countries (Algeria, Nigeria, Russia and Saudi Arabia) during 1980-
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2008 period.13
Because of these limitations of investment in domestic real assets, investment in foreign assets
thus appears as a natural alternative. In fact, foreign investment – even when the real yield is
low – may be often deemed superior than domestic capital formation because it avoids some
of the incidental costs (e.g. inflation, relative price distortion) that arise from a rapid increase
in domestic spending. Importantly, investment in foreign financial assets serves to achieve the
dual purpose of stabilization and precautionary saving. The stabilization objective intends to
set aside a portion of oil revenue at times of higher than average expected receipts, which can
be used to supplement current revenues in times of below average receipts (World Bank, 2006).
Accumulated resources held in oil fund can provide a precautionary cushion against unexpected
incidents such as war (e.g. the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990) or financial crisis (e.g. the
2007-2008 economic and financial crisis). Given that the withdrawal rules of many oil funds are
tied to domestic budgetary needs,14 investment in foreign financial assets play a crucial role in
the development of domestic capital formation during times of weaker international oil prices.15
Summing up, the saving-investment relationship in the oil-exporting developing countries
seems to be more the consequence of States’ discretionary choices rather than of economic forces.
While less profitable projects get financed during boom period and good quality projects are
axed during the bust, the oil-exporting developing countries have yet to formulate clear-cut
economic rules that would smooth out investment flows over the business cycles. Affected
by internal pressures of sociopolitical circumstances, domestic development strategy in these
countries has not always worked out as intended. Taken this way, most of the major oil-exporting
developing countries still remain a variant of Hirschman’s (1958) policy of unbalanced growth.
13FDI is unlikely to have any effect on this. Whilst FDI can generally promote domestic capital formation,
inward FDI flows in oil-exporting countries have been heavily directed towards energy and construction sector.
In particular, FDI in real estate and construction may contribute little to diversifying the productive base of the
economy or upgrading labor skills. It is therefore very unlikely that the average oil-exporting developing country
stands to gain from FDI unless it invests in the knowledge economy. See ESCWA (2008) for further discussion.
14See Appendix III in Ossowski et al. (2008) for stylized features of oil funds in selected oil-producing countries.
15This is based on the assumption that foreign financial assets can be converted easily into money. Nonetheless,
foreign portfolio investment option has serious drawbacks, as was discovered during the recent financial crisis
during which the market value of GCC’s external portfolio dropped by 27% or equivalent to a capital loss of $350
billion (see, Sester and Ziemba, 2009).
7
3 Empirical results
As a first step, let us comment on the average savings and investment rates reported in Table
1, where we divided our study period (1970-2008) into subperiods marked by the various oil
shocks. Investment is measured by both total investment (which includes inventory changes
and gross fixed investments) and by fixed investment.
It is immediately evident that, while the investment rates in the Gulf countries (GCC) have
always been comparable to those of the largest industrial economies (G7: Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, USA), savings rates have been consistently much higher, in fact
often almost twice as large. More precisely, on average over the 1970-2008 period savings and
total investments have been respectively 42% and 23.3% of Gross National Income (GNI) in
the GCC, compared to 21.9% and 22.2% in the G7. In the GCC these averages hide pretty
large variations in time, as well as differentials across countries. The GCC 1990-2008 savings
average, 37.9%, is only two-third of the 1974-1980 savings rate (55%), while the highest 1970-
2008 national average (Qatar, 50.6%) is almost twice as large as the lowest (Bahrain, 30.4%).
In fact, the smallest saving rates are always found in Bahrain and the highest in the UAE up
to 1989, and in Qatar thereafter. Investment rates are relatively less variable. Looking at the
GCC aggregate over time, we find pretty similar values in all periods but 1974-1980, when the
peak was registered. Across countries, investment rates have always been quite low in Kuwait
and high in Oman and UAE; remarkably, Qatar is the only country where the 1990-2008 value
is higher than those of the 1974-1989 period for both total and fixed investment. Looking at
the plots in Fig. 2 some large additive outliers are also evident: savings in Kuwait (1991) and
Oman (1973), total investments in Saudi Arabia (1973), both fixed and total investments in the
UAE (1974). All these outliers are easily explained with dramatic political events. The 1973-74
outliers are the consequences of first oil shock caused by the OPEC embargo. In Oman this
caused national income to fall in 1973 (-4.6% at current prices in local currency; the same applies
for the growth rates that will be quoted below). Since consumption grew strongly (+34.9%)
savings registered a large drop. At the same time, inventories fell dramatically in Saudi Arabia,
and both measures of investments in UAE (though not as strongly). Finally, Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait in 1990 caused the GNI of the latter to fall by nearly 38% and national consumption
to increase by 78%. From Fig. 2 we can further appreciate that saving and investment rates,
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though sometimes have radically different mean levels, may be dynamically related. The next
natural step is thus to establish their time series properties; this task, usually routinely, here
requires some care for the presence of the additive outliers (AOs) discussed above. Vogelsang
(1999) showed that AOs cause the standard Dickey-Fuller (DF) tests to overreject the null
hypothesis of a unit root (intuitively, the mean reversion taking place after the AOs overshadow
the behavior in the rest of the sample). To tackle this problem we have two options. The first is,
following Vogelsang (1999), to augment the usual DF autoregressions with dummy variables16
for each AO. Fortunately, the most delicate part of this procedure, which is identifying the
precise dates of the outliers, in our case does not create any problems: our outliers are all very
large and have natural political/economic explanations.
The other option is to remove the AOs, e.g. using the program TRAMO (Go´mez and
Maravall, 2001) and use the standard DF tests. In fact, as pointed out by Nielsen (2004) in
his discussion of the related problem of cointegration analysis with outliers, the two approaches
are closely related, as impulse dummies remove completely the outlying observation. In our
data set removing the AOs has the non-trivial advantage of allowing the use of logarithms
for the saving rate in Kuwait and the investment rate in Saudi Arabia, where the AO are
negative. For robustness’ sake we however decided to check both methods. The TRAMO
procedure identified AOs precisely in the expected periods (for savings: Kuwait 1991, Oman
1973; for investments: Saudi Arabia 1973, UAE 1974). From Table 2 we can see that the two
approaches lead to the same conclusions. Very much the same applies to the standard and GLS
versions of the ADF tests, computed for the other cases. The results of this battery of tests
suggest non-stationarity for savings with the only exception of Oman and mostly stationarity
for total investments (except Qatar and the UAE). Fixed investments appear to be I(1) in Qatar
and Saudi Arabia, I(0) in Bahrain, Kuwait (though here the ADF and ADF-GLS tests yield
conflicting results), Oman and the UAE. The picture is therefore rather confused. Given the
nature of our data we should not forget that an underlying non-stationary behavior may be
overshadowed by the presence of few large, isolated swings. We therefore decided to test for a
cointegrating relationship in all cases.
Following Juselius (2006), we removed the AOs prior to estimation and testing, so to be
161 only in the outlying observation) of length equal to that of the ADF polynomial plus one.
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able to specify for all cases the following vector autoregression (VAR) in logs17:
[
∆it
∆st
]
=
[
θ1
θ2
]
+Πi
[
it−1
st−1
]
+
∑p
j=1
γj
[
∆it−j
∆st−j
]
+
[
εit
εst
]
(1)
where s = ln(S/Y ), i = ln(I/Y ). When cointegration holds Π = [α1α2]
′[β1β2] , so that the
long-run saving retention ratio is ρ = −β2/β1. From the results of ADF tests we expect the
stationary dynamic model
it = δ1 +
∑p
j=1
φiit−1 +
∑p
j=1
ψjst−j + ηit (2)
to be possibly adequate for Oman; in this case ρ =
∑p
j=1 ψj/(1 −
∑p
j=1 φj). The cointegration
statistics are reported in Table 3 for the total investment rates-savings VARs, and in Table 4
for the fixed investment rates-savings ones, while the estimates of the long-run retention rates
ρ are collected in Table 5; some more details on the VARs (lag order, diagnostics) can be found
in Table A.2 in the Appendix. A first remark is that, consistently with the ADF tests, in Oman
all variables are found to be stationary. Second, the relationship between total and fixed capital
investments and savings is generally, but not always, the same. More specifically, cointegration
always holds in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, while in Qatar and the UAE the evidence
of a relationship is somehow weaker. In Qatar over the entire 1970-2008 period savings appear
to cointegrate with total investment, but not with fixed investment, while in the UAE the
opposite happens (savings cointegrate with fixed investment, but not with total investment).
In both cases a level relationship does seem to exist if we take only the years after the first oil
shock (1975-2008). The p-value for total investment in UAE is slightly larger than 10% (13%
for the Trace test), but it may be considered significant in view of the low power which should
be expected with our rather small sample size (33 years).
The estimates of the long-run saving retention ratio range from 0.15 (Kuwait, total in-
vestment) to 0.84 (UAE, total investment), values comparable to those found for the OECD
economies (see, e.g. Di Iorio and Fachin, 2010a). Although most estimates are rather unprecise,
it is fairly clear that the association between savings and capital formation (both total and fixed)
17The VAR augmented with dummy variables lead to the same conclusions for the UAE, the only non-
stationary case with non-negative AOs (detailed results are available on request).
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is rather close in Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and UAE, while it is quite weak in Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia. In light of the structural bottlenecks prevailing in the GCC region (Section 2), domes-
tic investment is expected to strongly depend on national saving largely because hydrocarbon
revenues (and therefore government expenditure) remain the engine of economic growth. As
capital accounts are equally open across the GCC region, the differences in coefficient estimates
cannot be explained by varying degrees of international capital mobility. Hence, we need to
search for other explanations: one such factor is the degree of domestic absorptive capacity
mentioned in Section 2. This factor is likely to be particularly important for Kuwait, which has
extremely limited absorptive capacity in both agriculture and industry, relative to other GCC
members. Kuwait’s rate of domestic investment (total, fixed) is lowest among GCC members
(see Table 1), possibly because of the low capital-to-government spending ratio.18 The limited
domestic absorption capacity has prompted Kuwait to place a large portion of its oil revenue
in foreign assets, which generated substantial investment income that sometimes exceeded the
income from oil exports.19 In fact, income from foreign assets helped Kuwait to deal with two
large crises in its history: the 1982 Souk al-Manakh (informal) stock market crash and the 1990
Iraqi invasion.20 In contrast, the high retentions rates in Qatar and the UAE can be explained
by these countries efforts to deepen economic diversification by expanding their non-oil produc-
tion capacities. Although, in the case of Qatar, the diversification embarked on by investing a
substantial amount of capital to expand production facilities of its natural gas sector. Thus,
while Qatar’s oil production is dwarfed by its neighbors Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, it
is now the world’s leading exporter of liquified natural gas (LNG). In fact, export proceedings
from LNG have recently surpassed those from oil, helping Qatar to partially decouple from
volatile oil cycles.21
18In fact, the lowest in the GCC region: Over the 1975-2008 period, the capital-to-government spending ratio
ranged from 14% (Kuwait) to 21% (Qatar and UAE), 23% (Oman) and 26% (Saudi Arabia). Data for Bahrain
was not available. Source: authors’ calculation based on national authorities.
19Kuwait is one of the few OPEC members with oil operations (production and refinery) worldwide. Kuwait
Petroleum Corp. has over 4000 service stations in six European countries under its Q8 brand. Further discussion
is available in Amuzegar (2001, pp. 77-84). See also Figure 3.2 in Fennell (1997) for a time series plot of Kuwait’s
developments in fiscal revenue.
20For further discussions on these two events, see IMF (1997).
21Figure 1(d) depicts the recent (partial) decoupling of national savings from oil revenue in Qatar, largely due
to new gas facilities coming on stream. While oil production remains an important part of Qatar’s hydrocarbons
composition, in terms of the volume of energy output it is eclipsed by the gas sector. In 2007, Qatar’s gas reserves
are estimated to be equivalent to 161 billion barrels of oil (nearly six times of its current 27.4 billion barrels of
crude oil reserves), see IIF (2008). Although spot gas price is as volatile as oil price (Pindyck, 2004), in reality
LNG market is primarily driven by long-term contracts (and therefore stable demand) with pricing mechanism
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Measured as the ratio of oil output to GDP, the UAE is by far the economy least dependent
on oil in the region. The oil-to-GDP ratio has declined from 57% in 1980 to only 11% in 2007 –
see Table A.1 in the Appendix. The scale of industrial development across various UAE regions
has surpassed than that of other GCC states, while Dubai, the second largest Emirates in the
UAE, has emerged as the leading financial center in the Middle East. We believe that these
unique developments in Qatar and the UAE are behind the comparatively higher correlation
between saving and investment in these countries. Bahrain and Oman, whose oil resources are
relatively smaller, were under severe pressure to diversify and to create a viable non-oil economy.
Pragmatic development policies by respective government have helped both Oman and Bahrain
to progress to higher levels of economic sophistication and welfare.22 While both nations relied
on oil revenues to support their development efforts, these were never large enough to do serious
damage. Over the 1980-2008 period, Oman recorded the highest and Bahrain the second highest
positive rate of real per capita GDP growth, while the remaining four Gulf countries registered
negative growth.23 Further, both countries have enjoyed relatively stable growth rates, which
was conducive to private sector-led growth. In contrast, the low retention rates estimated
for Saudi Arabia in spite of a comparably large domestic production base including a strong
private non-oil sector appears to be in stark contrast with the picture just drawn for these two
countries. In fact, a recent study by Looney (2004) reveals that over the 1960-2002 period the
Saudi Arabian economy registered a falling public and a stagnating private investment rates in
the context of a rapidly growing population. During this period, private investment averaged
just over 10% of total expenditure, while the share of public investment gradually declined
from 25% in 1975 to around 5% in 2002. Surprisingly, private investment was not significantly
affected by the 1973-74 oil boom, nor did it expand in line with the post- 1973-74 to 1985
expansion in the share of private sector activity in GDP. Further, Saudi Arabia’s budgetary
allocation to economic expenditures, which add to productive capital formation, declined from
around 25% in 1980 to a little over 7% by 2003 (Looney, 2004). By comparison, about one third
pegged to a competing fuel (e.g., crude oil). Changes in spot price or operating costs are unlikely to affect LNG
prices in the short term. Qatar’s steady increase in reliance on LNG exports over oil exports is, therefore, can
be regarded as an indication of the partial (revenue) decoupling from the volatile oil (revenue) cycle; or a case of
production diversification within the hydrocarbon sector.
22In fact, Oman has been classified as the only Arab ‘success story’ by the prestigious US Commission on
Growth and Development (2008, Table 1). Looney (2009) provides a detailed comparative analysis of development
stories in Oman and Bahrain.
23Authors’ calculation based on IMF World Economic Outlook database (October 2010 version).
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of the budget was spent on defence and security, and half on salaries, helping Saudi Arabia to
turn into a full-fledged rentier state (Amuzegar, 2001, pp. 96-102). Summing up, the rather low
(aggregate) investment rate compared to other regional neighbors (Table 1) appears consistent
with Saudi Arabia’s falling public and stagnating private investment rates. Moreover, compared
to other regional economies, Saudi Arabia is less integrated to world financial markets in the
sense of its lack of banking sophistication and the very low foreign participation in the domestic
financial sector.24
It is interesting to compare the findings of this paper to those of other oil-exporting countries
(both developed and developing). Using Norwegian data, Jansen and Schulze (1996) found
short-run correlation between saving and investment around 0.70 from the fifties to the early
seventies during which strict capital controls were in place, negative correlation during Norway’s
structural adjustment to the oil discoveries, and zero correlation after 1978 suggesting that the
FH puzzle does not exist for Norway. Based on 1961-86 data for selected OECD countries,
Bayoumi (1990) found negative but statistically insignificant relationship (-0.21) between saving
and total investment in Norway, and negative and significant correlation (-0.55) between saving
and fixed investment. For Canada, Bayoumi (1990) observed a high positive and significant
correlation (0.83) between saving and total investment, and a significant correlation of 0.25
between saving and fixed investment, implying that cyclical factors accounted for the bulk of
time series correlation of Canadian saving and investment. More recently, over the post-1975
period, Nason and Rogers (2002) observed that investment booms in Canada are associated
with current account deficit, highlighting the role of capital mobility or that the FH puzzle
does not hold for Canada. This result may come as no surprise given that Canada, a prototype
small open economy, would satisfy most of the aspects of the intertemporal small open economy
model – see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) for an excellent review of this research.
Hadiwibowo (2010) finds an almost one to one relation between saving and investment in
the short- and long-run for Indonesia based on quarterly observations from 1984-1995. The high
correlation between saving and investment coexists with free capital mobility in Indonesia, im-
plying that domestic investment was financed by domestic or national savings, and much of the
capital inflows were used to pay for the net factor income. Hadiwibowo’s (2010) results appear to
24Market share of foreign banks by total assets is 2% in Saudi Arabia, compared to 10% in Kuwait and Qatar,
12% in Oman, 21% in UAE and 57% in Bahrain. See Al-Hassan et al. (2010) for additional discussion.
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be consistent with Sinha and Sinha (2004), who obtained a short-run coefficient of 1.22 between
saving and fixed investment for Indonesia. Sinha and Sinha (2004), in their multicountry anal-
ysis, also report short-run correlation between saving and fixed investment for Algeria (0.13),
Bolivia (1.06), Canada (1.33), Congo (-0.20), Ecuador (0.54), Gabon (0.79), Norway (0.12),
Syria (0.52), Trinidad and Tobago (0.23) and (former) Soviet Union (0.87). These estimates,
however, differ greatly in terms of their statistical significance, number of sample observations
and the way the autoregressive error processes were modeled. Montiel (1994) provides series of
estimates of FH regressions for developing countries over the 1970-90 period. Focusing on the
results for oil-exporting developing countries based on error-correction instrumental variable
regressions,25 the estimates ranged between -0.13 (Angola), 0.03 (Mexico), 0.19 (Gabon), 0.22
(Ecuador), 0.23 (Indonesia), 0.29 (Congo), 0.74 (Nigeria) and 1.59 (Venezuela). Although in
view of the differences in estimation methods any comparison is to be taken with great care,
overall the impression is that the relationship estimated for our dataset of GCC countries does
seem to be stronger than for most other oil-producing countries.
4 Conclusions
The evidence brought together in this paper suggests that a long-run association between saving
and investment is a robust empirical regularity in the six GCC oil-exporting developing coun-
tries. However, this evidence cannot be taken as supporting the existence of a Feldstein-Horioka
puzzle, as capital accounts are known to be extremely open across all the six GCC economies.
Rather, the positive long-run relationships between levels of saving and investment rates are
to interpreted taking into account two main factors: (i) all countries need to diversify revenues
in view of the depletable nature of oil reserves; (ii) the absorptive capacity is different across
economies. Point (i) explains why in all cases investment depends on savings: essentially, oil
revenues are spent partly in domestic developments plans, partly in acquiring fixed or financial
assets abroad. Point (ii) explains why the mix of these two options varies across economies. The
particularly weak saving-investment link in Kuwait is likely to be due to its extremely limited
absorptive capacity, whereas the strong link found for Qatar and UAE is easily explained by
25Of the six specifications, the error-correction instrumental variable framework was preferred by the author
as it addressed all of the econometric issues raised in his paper.
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the sustained quest of these countries to reduce dependence on oil by expanding other sectors
of their economies. Similar considerations apply to Bahrain and Oman, which were forced early
on to follow this path by the paucity of their oil reserves. The wise use of oil revenues helped
these countries to muster high rates of internal saving and investment and to eventually become
the leading long-term economic performers among the six Gulf oil-producing nations. Finally,
the very weak saving-investment link in Saudi Arabia appears consistent with the falling public
and stagnating private investment rates in this country.
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Table 1: Investment and Savings rates in the Gulf economies, 1970-2008
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi A. UAE GCC G7
Saving rate
1970-1973 26.9 45.0 41.6 53.6 44.0 69.6 46.8 25.7
1974-1980 31.3 65.5 46.6 55.7 59.4 71.6 55.0 23.4
1981-1989 29.5 46.1 41.0 41.0 26.2 47.7 38.6 21.4
1990-2008 31.2 33.7 35.8 52.6 36.1 38.1 37.9 20.8
1970-2008 30.4 43.4 39.5 50.6 38.8 49.5 42.0 21.9
Total Investment rate
1970-1973 21.6 12.4 30.3 25.6 10.9 30.8 21.9 25.7
1974-1980 26.8 13.7 39.7 23.6 28.3 33.6 27.6 24.6
1981-1989 25.9 14.8 30.5 17.2 22.5 27.1 23.0 22.3
1990-2008 21.9 14.7 23.5 28.8 19.6 24.7 22.2 20.5
1970-2008 23.7 14.3 28.8 24.9 20.9 27.5 23.3 22.2
Fixed Investment rate
1970-1973 23.5 12.1 30.7 25.1 17.8 26.6 22.6 24.6
1974-1980 24.8 12.2 37.2 23.1 21.6 33.1 25.3 23.8
1981-1989 21.8 14.2 27.8 17.2 21.6 26.4 21.5 22.0
1990-2008 20.7 13.7 22.3 26.8 18.6 23.6 21.0 20.3
1970-2008 22.0 13.4 27.1 23.7 19.7 26.3 22.0 21.8
Saving rate: 100×(Gross Savings)/Gross National Income);
Savings : Gross National Income-National Consumption;
Total Investment rate: 100×(Gross Capital Formation/Gross National Income);
Fixed Investment rate: 100×(Gross Fixed Capital Formation/Gross National Income);
Saudi A.: Saudi Arabia; UAE : United Arab Emirates;
GCC : Gulf Cooperation Countries, aggregate of all Gulf countries;
G7 : Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, USA.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, United
Nations, October 2009.
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Table 2: Unit root tests
ADF ADF-GLS ADF-AO ADF-TRAMO Series is:
Saving rate (log)
Bahrain -1.18 [68.6] -1.28 [18.6] - - I(1)
Kuwait - - -2.11a -1.82 [36.4] I(1)
Oman - - -3.34 [∗] -3.44 [1.6] I(0)
Qatar -1.35 [59.5] -1.37 [15.7] - - I(1)
Saudi A. -1.17 [67.6] -1.22 [20.4] - - I(1)
UAE -1.58 [48.3] -1.17 [22.3] - - I(1)
Total Investment rate (log)
Bahrain -2.90 [5.5] -2.96 [0.0] - - I(0)
Kuwait -4.40 [0.0] -4.46 [0.0] - - I(0)
Oman -2.82 [6.5] -2.00 [4.4] - - I(0)
Qatar -1.81 [37.2] -1.85 [6.1] - - I(1)
Saudi A. - - -3.81a [∗∗] -3.42 [1.6] I(0)
UAE - - -1.52 -1.44 [55.5] I(1)
Fixed Investment rate (log)
Bahrain -4.48 [0.0] -3.13 [1.7] - - I(0)
Kuwait -2.67 [9.0] -4.47 [0.0] - - I(0)
Oman -2.67 [9.0] -2.01 [4.3] - - I(1)
Qatar -1.81 [36.8] -1.87 [6.0] - - I(1)
Saudi A. - - -0.30 -1.01 [27.8] I(1)
UAE -3.06 [3.8] -3.11 [0.2] - - I(0)
ADF : Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, 100× p−value in brackets;
ADF −GLS: ADF with GLS correction, 100× p−value in brackets;
ADF −AO: ADF augmented with dummy variables for the following AOs: Savings:
Kuwait 1991, Oman 1973; Investments: Saudi Arabia 1973, UAE 1974; Fixed Invest-
ments: Saudi Arabia 1974.
ADF − TRAMO: ADF on series depurated from AOs with the program TRAMO,
AOs as in ADF-AO above;
*,**: significant at 5% ,1%; critical values: 5%: -2.43, 1%:-3.58;
a : test computed on the natural values;
In all cases lag length fixed following Ng and Perron (1995);
-: not available; all other abbreviations and definitions: see Table 1.
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Table 3: Total investment and Saving rates in the long-run
Rank Trace Lmax Series are:
Bahrain 0 13.52 [9.7] 12.98 [7.8]
1 0.54 [46.2] CI(1, 1)
Kuwait 0 16.71 [3.1] 14.80 [3.9]
1 1.91 [16.7] CI(1, 1)
Oman 0 33.67 [0] 30.40 [0]
1 3.27 [7.1] I(0)
Qatar 0 16.71 [3.1] 15.48 [3.0]
1 1.22 [26.9] CI(1, 1)
Saudi A. 0 23.17 [0.2] 20.61 [0.3]
1 2.56 [11.0] CI(1, 1)
UAE 0 12.53 [13.4] 10.13 [20.8]
1 2.41 [12.1] CI(1, 1)
Trace Trace test, Lmax maximal eigenvalue test;
H0 : rank = r, p-value in square brackets;
CI(1, 1) : I(1) and cointegrated; I(0): stationary;
Series corrected for AOs : Savings: Kuwait 1991, Oman 1973;
Investments: Saudi Arabia 1973, UAE 1974; Fixed Investments:
Saudi Arabia 1974.
UAE : 1975-2008.
Table 4: Fixed investment and Saving rates in the long-run
Rank Trace Lmax Series are:
Bahrain 0 13.19 [10.8] 13.06 [7.8]
1 13.89 [70.9] CI(1, 1)
Kuwait 0 16.76 [3.0] 14.87 [3.8]
1 1.89 [16.9] CI(1, 1)
Oman 0 32.76 [0] 29.74 [0]
1 3.02 [8.2] I(0)
Qatar 0 14.65 [6.5] 13.87 [5.6]
1 0.78 [37.6] CI(1, 1)
Saudi A. 0 26.21 [0] 24.35 [0]
1 1.86 [17.3] CI(1, 1)
UAE 0 16.19 [3.7] 14.37 [4.6]
1 1.82 [17.7] CI(1, 1)
All abbreviations and details : See Table 3;
Qatar : 1975-2008.
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Table 5: Long-run saving retention rates in the Gulf economies
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi A. UAE
Total
Investments
0.52
(0.24)
0.15
(0.21)
0.69
(11.3)
0.82
(0.23)
0.29
(0.08)
0.84
(0.20)
Fixed
Investments
0.41
(0.21)
0.16
(0.23)
0.55
(18.8)
0.78
(0.24)
0.09
(0.06)
0.41
(0.18)
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE : ρ̂ = −β̂2/β̂1, model (1), FIML
estimates, standard errors in brackets;
UAE, Total Investments : 1975-2008;
Qatar, Fixed Investments : 1975-2008;
Oman: ρ̂ =
∑p
j=1 ψ̂j/(1 −
∑p
j=1 φ̂j), model (2), OLS estimates, in brackets:
100× p-value of H0 :
∑p
j=1 ψj = 0
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(a) Bahrain (b) Kuwait
(c) Oman (d) Qatar
(e) Saudi Arabia (f) U.A.E.
Figure 1: Savings/GNI (solid line), Oil revenue/GNI (dashed line) in the Gulf economies, 1974-
2008 (data for oil revenues not available before 1974). Oil revenue does not include export
proceeds from natural gas.
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(a) Bahrain (b) Kuwait
(c) Oman (d) Qatar
(e) Saudi Arabia (f) U.A.E.
Figure 2: Savings/GNI (solid line), Total Capital Formation/GNI (dashed line), Gross Fixed
Capital Formation/GNI (short dashed line) in the Gulf economies, 1970-2008.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: The role of oil in GCC countries’ government revenues, exports and GDP (percent)
Government revenues Exports GDP
1980 2007 1980 2007 1980 2007
Bahrain 77.0 80.0 33.6 79.2 28.0 24.6
Kuwait 82.0 93.1 90.0 94.4 59.7 53.2
Oman 86.0 76.4 92.4 75.8 59.3 45.1
Qatar 94.0 60.0 95.0 80.8 64.0 56.4
Saudi Arabia 91.2 82.5 99.9 88.0 65.8 50.9
UAE 96.0 77.0 94.0 38.5 57.0 11.1
Source: Basher (2010).
Table A.2: VAR lag orders and autocorrelation tests
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE
Total investment rate - Saving rate
lags 1 1 1 2 2 1
p(Q)S 67.7 56.3 61.5 94.5 84.5 70.4
p(Q)I 17.0 64.8 56.4 82.5 95.4 24.7
Fixed investment rate - Saving rate
lags 1 1 1 2 1 1
p(Q)S 87.2 49.5 37.8 74.6 77.4 75.6
p(Q)I 12.8 65.3 26.8 83.5 74.7 90.9
lags: order of the VECM on the basis of AIC, BIC and Hannan-Quinn;
p(Q) : 100 × p-value of the Ljung-Box test for autocorrelation of order
1;
Qatar, Fixed Investments : 1975-2008.
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